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Abstract. This paper summarises the main lessons learnt from deploying WLCG production 
services, with a focus on Reliability, Scalability, Accountability, which lead to both 
manageability and usability. Each topic is analysed in turn. Techniques for zero-user-visible 
downtime for the main service interventions are described, together with pathological cases 
that need special treatment. The requirements in terms of scalability are analysed, calling for as 
much robustness and automation in the service as possible. The different aspects of 
accountability - which covers measuring / tracking / logging / monitoring what is going on – 
and has gone on - is examined, with the goal of attaining a manageable service. Finally, a 
simple analogy is drawn with the Web in terms of usability - what do we need to achieve to 
cross the chasm from small-scale adoption to ubiquity? 
1.  Introduction 
Ian Foster‘s famous paper ―What is the Grid? A Three Point Checklist” [1] lists 3 criteria that are 
proposed for determining whether a given system is ―a Grid‖ or not. The Worldwide LHC Computing 
Grid (WLCG) [2] is a system that uses resources provided by two major production Grids – namely 
the Enabling Grid for E-SciencE (EGEE) [3] in Europe and elsewhere, and the Open Science Grid 
(OSG) [4] primarily in the US. Thus, by definition, WLCG satisfies the first two criteria – these two 
major Grids are clearly separate management domains and at least a workable degree of de-facto 
standards is needed for successful production services to be offered. This paper addresses the third 
point in this checklist – quoted in full below – describing in detail the lessons learnt from offering 
world-wide production services across many sites for a number of years. 
 
“… to deliver nontrivial qualities of service. (A Grid allows its constituent resources to be used in a 
coordinated fashion to deliver various qualities of service, relating for example to response time, 
throughput, availability, and security, and/or co-allocation of multiple resource types to meet complex 
user demands, so that the utility of the combined system is significantly greater than that of the sum of 
its parts.)‖ 
2.  The WLCG Computing Model 
The purpose of the WLCG service is to satisfy the data processing and analysis needs of the LHC 
experiments at CERN. These needs have been described many times (see, for example [5]) and the 
WLCG service implementation is based on a hierarchical model that was first proposed by the 
MONARC (Models of Networked Analysis at Regional Centres for LHC Experiments) project [6]. In 
some senses, this model is an evolution and a formalisation of the move to distributed processing that 






is very similar to that proposed by Jim Gray et al. [8], with the sum of resources at each ―tier‖ being 
approximately constant. 
 
As a reminder, the main responsibilities of the different tiers of the WLCG computing model are as 
follows: 
 
• Tier0 (CERN): safe keeping of RAW data (first copy); first pass reconstruction, distribution of 
RAW data and reconstruction output (Event Summary Data or ESD) to Tier1; reprocessing of 
data during LHC down-times; 
• Tier1: safe keeping of a proportional share of RAW and reconstructed data; large scale 
reprocessing and safe keeping of corresponding output; distribution of data products to Tier2s and 
safe keeping of a share of simulated data produced at these Tier2s; 
• Tier2: Handling analysis requirements and proportional share of simulated event production and 
reconstruction. 
 
Sites that are members of the WLCG collaboration sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
[9] that lists the specific responsibilities for that site, the resources that they will offer each supported 
virtual organisation (VO), the maximum time for intervening in the case of service degradation or loss, 
as well as the annual availability that should be provided. However, even in the simplest case, these 
―services‖ in fact involve numerous components – that sometimes involve other (WLCG) sites and/or 
third parties, such as network operations. An example is given below for Tier1 sites: 
 
“Tier1 services must be provided with excellent reliability, a high level of availability and rapid 
responsiveness to problems, since the LHC Experiments depend on them in these respects.  
The following services shall be provided by each of the Tier1 Centres in respect of the LHC 
Experiments that they serve, according to policies agreed with these Experiments. With the exception 
of items i, ii, iv and x, these services also apply to the CERN analysis facility:  
 
i. acceptance of an agreed share of raw data from the Tier0 Centre, keeping up with data acquisition;  
ii. acceptance of an agreed share of first-pass reconstructed data from the Tier0 Centre;  
iii. acceptance of processed and simulated data from other centres of the WLCG;” 
 
3.  WLCG Service Challenges 
In 2004 the WLCG Service Challenge programme [10] was launched, aimed at “achieving the goal of 
a production quality world-wide Grid that meets the requirements of the LHC experiments in terms of 
functionality and scale.” Whilst most widely known for their contribution in ramping up data 
movement and data management services, an often over-looked but extremely important aspect of this 
programme was that of delivering full production services. Indeed, whilst the first two challenges 
focussed on basic infrastructure setup and network tuning, the bar was raised considerably for Service 
Challenges 3 and 4. Both challenges included not only tests performed using the dteam virtual 
organisation, but more importantly included extensive production use by all four of the major LHC 
experiments. As such – and for the first time – an attempt was made to identify and deploy all of the 
needed services at the participating sites. The target date for the deployment of these services at the 
Tier0 was May 2005. This was a highly ambitious goal – not only was this date well in advance of the 
delivery of the final ―Baseline Services‖ working group report [11], but also a number of the 
middleware components behind the corresponding services had never previously been deployed in 
production conditions, nor had they been tested by the experiments, nor integrated into their data 
processing environments. 
Realising that there were two distinct goals to be achieved and understanding the unlikelihood of 






were deployed in the production environment. These were a so-called pilot service – the goal of which 
was to expose the new service to the experiments in order to allow them to gain experience with it, 
integrate into their software and to provide early feedback and the standard production service – to be 
used both for dteam and – after and urgent fixes or enhancements from the experience with the pilot 
system – for the experiments‘ production processing. The requirements on these two instances in 
terms of stability versus rapid updates were clearly different and this model continues to prove valid 
for making available new features in the production system today. 
Other issues that compounded the task for initial service deployment were the lack of clear 
understanding of how these services would be used by the experiments – making resource estimation 
an impossible task – as well as the lack of available hardware resources. As is true for many 
laboratories, hardware resources at CERN are acquired through competitive tender and are typically 
over-subscribed. Thus, we had little choice but to deploy the services on the only boxes that were then 
available – typically batch worker nodes, lacking even dual power supplies and mirrored system disks 
– deferring the choice of suitable systems with which to target the needed availability and reliability to 
a later date. 
4.  WLCG Services – the “a priori” analysis 
Starting in August 2005, and based on the service levels implied in the WLCG MoU, an a priori 
analysis of the Tier0 WLCG services was performed. This targeted not only the hardware needs, but 
also the middleware requirements, operational procedures and all other service aspects involved in 
setting up robust and reliable services. In addition, the feedback and experience from the early months 
of Service Challenge 3 called for a significant number of service updates. In order to perform these, a 
―long shutdown‖ of several days was scheduled during October 2005. It was well understood that such 
intervention could not normally be performed on a production service, but this was felt to be the least 
intrusive method available at that time to perform the numerous pending upgrades – including not only 
deployment of new middleware releases, but also network reconfiguration, hardware moves and 
reallocation. Unfortunately, insufficient hardware was still unavailable to redeploy the services in an 
optimal manner, and their redeployment continued over a period of many months. This was first done 
using a regular ―intervention slot‖ – simplifying not only scheduling of such interventions with the 
experiments but also their production planning. However, it was soon realized that the coupling 
between the various services – not to mention their impact that in many cases extended way beyond 
the host site and was often Grid-wide – called for a less intrusive manner of performing such changes. 
5.  Expecting the (un-)expected 
It is a truism to state that anything that can go wrong will do so – this is often referred to as ―Murphy‘s 
law‖. Whilst this is even part of popular culture, it is still often ignored – who has not lost one or more 
files due to human error, hardware failure or even a combination, only to find out (or often to realise, 
in the case of a personal computer) that no adequate backup exists? However, do we systematically 
prepare for common failures or problems – let alone less likely scenarios? Experience from previous 
generations of HEP experiments – such as those at the LEP collider at CERN - remind us that there 
can be many causes of data loss or corruption, including software failures. Whilst naively some such 
scenarios would appear to be so unlikely that they can be readily dismissed, experience over more than 
two decades of running production services suggest that preparation for all eventualities is a much 
safer strategy. In the early days of attempting to deploy the European DataGrid (EDG) Replica 
Location Service (RLS) as a file catalogue, it was even claimed that if the release procedure were 
correctly followed, it would be ―impossible‖ for a bug to appear in the production system. More 
valuable lessons that were (re-)learnt by a new generation of service providers were the length of time 
that it takes to deploy a full production service and the amount of detail that is required in the 
associated planning process. Some concrete examples of events that have taken place that are more or 







 The Expected: 
o When services / servers don‘t respond or return an invalid status / message; 
o When users use a new client against an old server; 
o When the air-conditioning / power fails (again & again & again); 
o When 1000 batch jobs start up simultaneously and clobber the system; 
o A disruptive and urgent security incident… (again, we’ve forgotten…) 
 The Un-expected: 
o When disks fail and you have to recover from backup – and the tapes have been 
overwritten; 
o When a ‗transparent‘ intervention results in long-term service instability and 
(significantly) degraded  performance; 
o When a service engineer puts a Coke into a machine to ‗warm it up‘… 
 The Truly Un-expected: 
o When a fishing trawler cuts a trans-Atlantic network cable; 
o When a Tsunami does the equivalent in Asia Pacific; 
o When Oracle returns you someone else‘s data… 
o When mozzarella is declared a weapon of mass destruction… 
6.  Building Robust Services 
Techniques for building robust distributed services are well understood. However, not only does the 
Grid take the challenge of overall service reliability to new heights, but also the associated middleware 
has not always been designed with robust and reliable deployment in mind. Operations workshops 
have frequently highlighted either – in the worst case – the total absence of error messages and 
logging, or else the obscurity of such messages or the inconsistency of the logging itself. These and 
other such issues are described in the ―Grid Operations Cookbook‖ [12]. These issues are compounded 
further when trying to resolve cross-site issues, where to-date we have not even managed to 
consistently agree on the use of UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) for logging messages: in a 
worldwide Grid, being able to correlate events is clearly essential and there is no widely accepted 
alternative to the use of UTC, yet many services continue to log in local time – often in places that are 
inaccessible to those charged with problem resolution. These issues are high-lighted – but not yet 
resolved – in a presentation [13] prepared for the WLCG Collaboration workshop held in Victoria, 
BC, in September 2007. 
We describe briefly the main techniques in use at the WLCG Tier0 below. However, experience 
shows that some simple ―common-sense‖ rules need to be reiterated. The overall system is only as 
reliable as the ―weakest link‖ – there is no point in using redundant power supplies and / or load-
balanced servers if only a single power feed is used for all such systems. Similarly, a single network 
switch negates the investment in hardware and software redundancy. Whilst these guidelines seem 
obvious, they are not always followed. As a concrete example, the large majority of all Storage 
Resource Management (SRM) v1.1 load-balanced servers at CERN are deployed in a single rack and 
break both rules above. In the event of a power failure to this rack, the remaining systems rapidly 
entered overload and the entire service collapsed. (The argument that we should by now have migrated 
to SRM 2.2 can hardly be considered a justification in this case.) Even in the case when these simple 
guidelines are followed during the initial deployment of a service, all too frequently re-configuration 
of components of the service has resulted in later exposure. For example, replacement of network 
switches by newer models with more ports has meant that servers that were originally split over two or 
more switches end up behind a single-point-of-failure. In other words – and as will be re-iterated with 
further justifying arguments below – it is essential that an end-to-end service view is maintained: not 
just for interventions but for all service aspects. 
7.  Common Techniques 






 Load-balanced, stateless middle-tier servers (where the main application logic resides); 
 Database clusters, currently implemented on Oracle Real Application Clusters (RAC). 
A description of the database services at the Tier0 can be found in [14]. The evolution of database 
services for physics in the last twenty five years can be found in [15]. 
An additional technique – less well understood and with significant restrictions, such as the 
requirement for all services to be on the same network switch – is that of H/A Linux. This should only 
be used when the middleware involved does not support one of the previous techniques. This is 
currently used at CERN for the VOM(R)S (Virtual Organisation Membership Service / VOM 
Registration Service) service. 
However, it is important to stress that there is no free lunch – significant additional work is 
required at the middleware/application level to ensure that the software correctly supports these H/A 
techniques. Whist relatively straightforward for stateless middle-tier applications, it is far from trivial 
for database applications, let alone higher-level experiment services, which may well use multiple 
back-end services and where maintaining consistent state across eventual roll-back due to failover 
during update transactions needs to be carefully coded and tested. Particularly important in this respect 
is the developer / database administrator relationship, as described in [16]. Consider, for example, 
experiment-driven production data transfers. These involve numerous services, including storage 
management at the source and sink, possibly file and dataset catalogues, the File Transfer Service 
(FTS) and the experiments‘ own data management layers. In the middle of transferring a logically 
consistent set of files – opaque to the underlying generic services – one or more of the nodes hosting a 
database at source and / or sink fails. Is sufficient information passed up through the layers to the 
driving application to cleanly abort or preferably recover? Does the entire file set have to be aborted or 
can it be cleanly restarted? Is it even possibly to clearly identify all the possible failure modes and 
prepare for them? Most likely not. 
8.  Intervention Analysis 
An analysis of the causes of service interventions since the time of the European DataGrid (EDG) 
Replica Location Service (RLS) – a period of some 5 years – shows that the main cause for user-
visible downtime is scheduled interventions. This comes as a surprise, but is arguably good news. As 
they are scheduled, they can be readily addressed, whereas unscheduled interventions, which come not 
only from unstable middleware, but also from infrastructure instabilities, are harder to address. A first 
analysis of the times of unscheduled services – limited at this stage to the WLCG Tier0 and Tier1 sites 
– has been performed, revealing the following broad categories: 
 Power, cooling and network problems, responsible in the worse cases for complete site 
downtime for several hours or even days; 
 Problems with storage and related services, e.g. CERN Advanced Storage manager 
(CASTOR) or dCache (by definition); 
 Problems with back-end database services or the interaction between the application layer and 
the database, affecting services such as LCG File Catalog (LFC), FTS, VOMS, Service 
Availability Monitoring (SAM) etc. 
9.  Scheduled and Unscheduled Interventions 
As stated above, the main reason for service interruption is for scheduled interventions. The reasons 
include: 
 Adding additional resources to an existing service; 
 Replacing hardware used by an existing service; 






 Similar operations on DB backend (where applicable). 
Given the coupling between the various services and indeed their impact that is typically Grid-wide, 
early scheduling of these interventions is essential. The WLCG and even EGEE have agreed upon 
procedures for scheduling and announcing such interventions – including the availability of the 
service(s) at the end of the exercise. Interventions that are performed without following these 
procedures are classified as unscheduled and are counted against the corresponding service / site 
availability.  
Equally important is a detailed intervention plan – with responsibilities, timeline, decision points and 
roll-back strategy – as well as a post-mortem analysis, listing any problems encountered and their 
resolution. This is particularly important not only within a site – where different people may be 
responsible for performing a subsequent intervention – but also for preparing reliable procedures for 
external sites to perform similar intervention (services are typically upgraded to a new major release, 
e.g. FTS 2.0, first at the Tier0 and at the Tier1s only after a minimum of several weeks‘ experience at 
the Tier0). 
10.  WLCG Services – the “a posteriori” analysis 
As described above, an analysis was performed in 2005 based on our understanding of how the 
services would be used and how service degradation or loss would impact ongoing production. 
However, as has been seen on a number of occasions, experiments may adjust their usage of a service 
based on experience and/or the service may evolve to address observed weaknesses. It was therefore 
decided to redo this analysis, profiting from several years of production experience. Whilst this is very 
much work in progress, an initial analysis has already identified a number of weaknesses, as well as 
varying degrees of software maturity with respect to resilience to glitches and the ability to support 
‗transparent‘ service upgrades. This work will continue with the WLCG Tier1 sites, as well as the 
major Tier2s, with the goal of supporting transparent upgrades in all of the main services well prior to 
CHEP 2009. The main points of this review were as follows: 
 Hardware  
 Servers - Single or multiple, DNS load balanced, HA Linux, RAC, multiple power 
supplies / feeds, battery / diesel backup?  
 Software 
 Can the middleware handle loss of one or more servers?  
 Does service reliability improve or degrade with the number of servers? (Used for 
load 
 What is the impact to other services and/or users of a loss/degradation?  
 Quiesce/Recovery  
 Can the service be cleanly paused? 
 Is there built-in recovery when the service comes back?  
 Tests and Documentation  
 Have these procedures been (regularly) tested in practice, are they used to provide 
transparent interventions?  
 Does the required documentation for operations and service staff exist?  
 
Of these services, one of the most advanced is the (W)LCG File Catalog (LFC), shown 
schematically below. This is implemented using load-balanced servers in front of an Oracle RAC. In 
case of failure of one of more nodes (at either level) any remaining nodes take the load. Only in the 
case of failure of all nodes, or in the case of Oracle cluster-ware failure, is the entire service affected. 
The service has proven to be resilient to glitches and middleware upgrades – other than those requiring 
schema changes to the backend database – are routinely performed with zero user-visible downtime. 
The advantages of making services both resilient to short-term glitches (say up to 10 minutes, the 






covered by diesel Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS)) as well as supporting transparent service 
interventions as listed above are huge. Firstly, the users see a greatly improved service. Secondly, 
service providers have much more flexibility in scheduling interventions, which no longer need to be 
confined to error-prone early morning or later evening slots. These two advantages greatly improve 
the service provider – user relationship, reducing stress levels and providing further positive feedback. 
However, it must clearly be supported by the associated middleware, which is not always the case 
today. Fortunately, the analysis that has been performed has identified a small number of areas where 
large improvements can be obtained for relatively little effort. 
 
However, the LFC service is currently only used by two of the LHC VOs: by ATLAS as local file 
catalogue and by LHCb as a global catalogue, with a read-only replica at CNAF and eventually at all 
LHCb Tier1 sites. 
On the other hand services such as CASTOR(SRM) and the FTS that are ranked as critical Tier0 
services by all VOs currently have a number of single points of failure (SPOFs). Furthermore, 
CASTOR upgrades are intrusive and typically require a downtime of several hours. 
Finally, whilst the recent efforts in monitoring are both very welcome and long overdue, one 
should not fall into the trap of thinking that monitoring alone will make systems more reliable. It will 
certainly help identify areas that need to be improved, but robustness can only be achieved by design 
and not empirically. 
In summary, there is a relatively poor match between those services that are relatively well 
advanced in terms of resilience (such as Grid batch and the LFC), and those listed as critical by CMS 
below. 
11.  The User View 
The service availability that is by default measured in the WLCG is that of the basis component 
services – Compute Element (CE), Storage Element (SE), LFC etc. Whilst this is important to sites for 
understanding the status of the services that they offer and is increasingly supplemented by experiment 






list of critical services and the impact of failure or degradation has been prepared [18]. The services 
have been ranked on a scale from 0 (service not used by CMS) to 11(!) (CMS stops operating) [19]. 
The most critical category (11) is not currently treated, the most severe that remains (10 - CMS stops 
transferring data from the data taking pit to the CERN computer centre) is assigned to the following 
services: 
 Main Oracle backend service for CMS; 
 CERN SRM & CASTOR; 
 Data book-keeping system (CMS service); 
 Batch queues; 
 Kerberos; 
 Networking from the pit to the computer centre; 
 Campus networking; 
 (Fixed?) telephones; 
 Web backend system; 
 (File) transfer system from the pit to the computer centre. 
Classified as only slightly less critical are services related to data transfer from the Tier0 to Tier1s, 
including the WLCG File Transfer Service (FTS) and CMS‘ Physics Experimental Data Export 
(PhEDEx) system. Whilst some leeway can be bought by additional hardware – e.g. for transfer 
buffers both for pit to computer centre as well as Tier0-Tier1 transfers – these stringent requirements 
cannot currently be met and will have an impact on all aspects of service deployment, including 
hardware setup, middleware/storage-ware and operational procedures. 
12.  Preparing for Experiment-/Application-Driven Challenges 
Given a backdrop of such complexity, it may come as no surprise that the most effective strategy for 
ramping up experiment-driven challenges has been to establish clear goals and metrics for the exercise 
in question, to prepare carefully – testing all components individually and later together – and to 
gradually ramp-up in both scope and scale. This approach is that adopted by the CMS experiment [20] 
and will also be used for the foreseen Combined Computing Readiness Challenge (CCRC08)[21], 
proposed at the WLCG Collaboration workshop prior to this conference.  The scope of this challenge 
is given below – all of these tests should be run concurrently: 
• Test data transfers at 2008 scale: 
– Experiment site to CERN mass storage; CERN to Tier1 centres;  
– Tier1 to Tier1 centres; Tier1 to Tier2 centres; Tier2 to Tier2 centres 
• Test Storage to Storage transfers at 2008 scale:  
– Required functionality; Required performance 
• Test data access at Tier0, Tier1 at 2008 scale: 
– CPU loads should be simulated in case this impacts data distribution and access  
13.  The Grid is Greater than the Sum of its Parts 
The (W)LCG Technical Design Report (TDR) [22] list two motivations for adopting a Grid solution. 
These are as follows: 
1. Significant costs of [ providing ] maintaining and upgrading the necessary resources … more 
easily handled in a distributed environment, where individual institutes and … organisations 
can fund local resources … whilst contributing to the global goal 
2. … no single points of failure. Multiple copies of the data, automatic reassigning of tasks to 
resources… facilitates access to data for all scientists independent of location. … round the 
clock monitoring and support. 
For funding reasons, the first argument is clearly extremely important – for the reason stated in 
addition to the fact that many of the institutes involved are multi-disciplinary. Thus, not only for 






collaborating countries, such a scenario is much healthier than one where all resources are 
concentrated at the host laboratory (and acquired locally). 
The second argument needs further analysis. With the exception of services and processing that is 
performed at the Tier0 site, the fact that much of the data – e.g. with the exception of Monte Carlo 
data in a given Tier2‘s output buffer – is replicated at several or many sites, the partial of even total 
failure of a site should not stop the associated production or analysis. Similarly, some of the services – 
such as the FTS – are already designed to cater for service interruptions at source and/or sink site. For 
example, if the storage element (SE) at a given site is about to enter scheduled maintenance, the 
corresponding FTS channels that source or sink data in that SE can be paused. This still allows new 
transfer requests to be queued, but they will not be attempted until the channel is re-opened, avoiding 
wasting bandwidth on transfers that are bound to fail and potentially reducing the background load on 
support staff (analysing ―fake‖ failures.) 
14.  Operations & User Support Issues 
There is insufficient room in this paper to analyse these issues in detail. However, the solutions that 
are used in both areas today are limited in terms of the number of incidents that can be handled. For 
example, the current operations model is rather eyeball intensive and will not obviously scale to 
handle much larger numbers of VOs and/or sites, as would be expected to be the case in the future. 
Much can be done by making the services more robust by design and by automatic problem resolution 
and – where possible – correction. Furthermore, 24x7 coverage is not currently offered but will be 
needed – at least for the HEP VOs – in the not too distant future. Similarly, each problem ticket that 
requires human intervention has an associated cost. Problems that cannot be rapidly resolved and are 
passed to 3
rd
 level support can take many hours, days or even weeks to resolve. Only an extremely 
small number of such problems is required to bring the support system to its knees. These issues must 
clearly be addressed by any long term sustainable e-Infrastructure project that is to offer a viable 
service. 
15.  Crossing the Chasm 
Many analogies have been drawn between the Web and the Grid. What remains, in terms of 
challenges, for the Grid to cross the chasm from niche usage to ubiquity? One obvious answer is 
usability – had the tools for Web authoring remained as primitive as those offered even in the early 
days of Mosaic and other such browsers, it is hard to imagine it pervading all of our lives, as it does 
today. The bar is almost certainly much higher in the case of the Grid – although much work has done 
[23][24] to assist new applications to move to the Grid and to hide the complexity, it is still a complex, 
manpower intensive task. This will be a major challenge for future Grid initiatives, such as the 
European Grid Initiative [25] that is currently being studied.  
16.  Conclusions 
Despite almost impossible constraints, WLCG has managed in an extremely short time to turn 
prototype services into widely used, production quality systems. Whilst by no means perfect and – in a 
number of cases, most significantly in the area of storage management – with outstanding issues still 
to be resolved, worldwide production Grid services are a reality. The focused effort that was needed to 
establish these services will still be required for some time to come, with the clear goals of deploying 
the remaining residual services, ramping up service reliability and reducing the overall deployment 
and operational costs. The work on improving service reliability needs to concentrate on those areas 
that are of most concern to the experiments. In particular, this includes all services related to data 
acquisition, first pass processing and distribution of data to the Tier1s.  
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Glossary 
 
ALICE: A Large Ion Collider Experiment 
ATLAS: A Toroidal LHC ApparatuS 
CASTOR: CERN Advanced Storage Manager 
CE: Compute Element 
CERN: Centre Européenne pour la Recherche Nucléaire 
CMS: Compact Muon Solonoid: (A large general purpose detector and associated collaboration at 
CERN) 
DNS: Domain Name System 
EDG: European DataGrid 
EGEE: Enabling Grids for EsciencE 
ESD: Event Summary Data 
FTS: File Transfer Service 
LCG: LHC Computing Grid 
LHC: Large Hadron Collider 
LHCb: The Large Hadron Collider beauty experiment  
MONARC: Models of Networked Analysis at Regional Centres for LHC Experiments 
MoU: Memorandum of Understanding 
OSG: OpenScienceGrid 
PhEDEx: (CMS) Physics Experiment Data Export 
RAC: (Oracle) Real Application Clusters 
RLS: Replica Location Service 
SAM: Service Availability Monitoring 
SE: Storage Element 
SRM: Storage Resource Management 
TDR: Technical Design Report 
UTC: Coordinated Universal Time 
VO: Virtual Organisation  
VOMRS: Virtual Organisation VOM Registration Service 
VOMS: Virtual Organisation Membership Service  
WLCG: Worldwide LCG (the collaboration, as opposed to former middleware release) 
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